

Message Text

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NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 OIC-02 SS-15 NSC-05 AF-04 ARA-06 NEA-06 AEC-05

SAM-01 SAB-01 EB-07 OMB-01 MC-01 /104 W

----- 015126

R 101655Z DEC 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9282

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4823

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

CINCUSAFE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6888

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL NATO

SUBJ: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 10, 1974: AGENDA ITEM II,
STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

SYG LUNS INCORPORATED THIS AGENDA ITEM INTO THAT ON NATO FORCE
PLANNING (AGENDA ITEM III) AND ASKED THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILI-
TARY COMMITTEE TO LEAD OFF. IN HIS STATEMENT TO MINISTERS,
ADMIRAL HILL-NORTON CONCENTRATED ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE WARSAW
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PACT, FORCE PLANNING, THE MILITARY BUDGET, AND STANDARDIZATION.
HE ALSO CITED NEED FOR MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE.

BEGIN QUOTE:

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN,

IN THE LONG HISTORY OF THIS ALLIANCE, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY OFFICER WHO HAS HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF REPORTING TO DEFENSE MINISTERS HAS BEEN ABLE TO ADVISE YOU OR YOUR PREDECESSORS THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT HAVE EVER PAUSED IN THEIR PURSUIT OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES. NOR DO I BELIEVE THAT ANY OF MY PREDECESSORS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES AS CONTENT WITH THE RESOURCES AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

AND I, TODAY, REGRETTABLE, CANNOT BREAK WITH PRECEDENT. ALTHOUGH THIS PRESENTATION IS MINE, I MUST ADD THAT THE ANXIETY APPLIES AS WELL TO MY COLLEAGUES ON THE MILITARY COMMITTEE AND TO THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS.

WHAT I HAVE TO SAY WILL, THEREFORE, AND INEVITABLY, REHEARSE AT LEAST SOME ISSUES AND JUDGMENTS WITH WHICH YOU ARE FAMILIAR. MANY OF THE MATTERS ON WHICH WE, THE MILITARY, SEEK YOUR SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE MUST ULTIMATELY DEPEND ON THE PRIORITY WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENTS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE TO DEFENSE IN THE FACE OF PRESSURES ALREADY OUTLINED BY MINISTER FOSTERVOLL. MY COLLEAGUES AND I ARE ACUTELY AWARE OF THESE PRESSURES AND ALSO THAT THEY BEAR ON DIFFERENT COUNTRIES TO DIFFERING DEGREES, AND THEY HAVE BEEN UPPERMOST IN MY MIND IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS STATEMENT.

INTELLIGENCE

BUT FIRST, AND AS YOU HAVE NOT ON THIS OCCASION HAD AN INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING, I SHOULD LIKE TO COVER SOME OF THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE ON THE WARSAW PACT FORCES. THIS INFORMATION IS DRAWN ALMOST ENTIRELY FROM COLLATIONS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE INPUTS, AND I WOULD REMIND MINISTERS THAT THE MORE INFORMATION THAT YOU CAN SEE FIT TO RELEASE TO NATO, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS, THE BETTER THE ALLIANCE ASSESSMENTS WHICH CAN BE DEVELOPED IN THIS HEADQUARTERS AND BY THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS.

SINCE I SPOKE TO MINISTERS IN JUNE, THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF WARSAW PACT ACTIVITY. THE ONLY REACTION BY THEM TO THE EVENTS IN CYPRUS WAS TO ALERT SOME AIR-CONFIDENTIAL

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BORNE DIVISIONS, AND TO DECLARE A LARGE NUMBER OF SHIPS SOUTH-BOUND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MONTREUX CONVENTION, BUT THERE WERE NO ACTUAL MOVEMENTS AND ALL OTHER WP MILITARY ACTIVITIES DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS HAVE FOLLOWED ROUTINE PATTERNS.

SO FAR AS CAPABILITIES ARE CONCERNED, THEY HAVE ON TWO OCCASIONS THIS YEAR DEMONSTRATED THEIR ABILITY TO MOVE INCREASINGLY LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS BY AIR, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RECENT SEMI-ANNUAL ROTATION MOVED 95,000 MEN COMPARED WITH 29,000 AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR. THEY HAVE INTRODUCED TWO NEW SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES. THEY TEST FIRED AT SEA A NEW LONG RANGE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE, AND TWO MORE GUIDED MISSILE CRUIERS HAVE NOW JOINED THEIR FLEET. IF OUR REPORTS ON AIR BASE FACILITIES IN SOMALIA ARE CORRECT, THE USE

OF THESE, TOGETHER WITH THE REGULAR DEPLOYMENTS OF AIRCRAFT THEY NOW MAKE TO CUBA, AND CONAKRY, GIVES THEM MARITIME RE-CONNAISSANCE COVERING EVERY SHIPPING ROUTE IN THE WORLD. AIR BASE FACILITIES IN SOMALIA WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THEIR FAVOR WHEN THE SUEZ CANAL IS REOPENED EARLY NEXT YEAR, AND THIS IS ITSELF WILL OBVIOUSLY INCREASE THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE SOVIET FLEET.

IN THE AIR, WE KNOW THAT THE NEW MIG 23 FLOGGER AIRCRAFT IS NOW WIDELY DEPLOYED, AND THE MIG 25 FOXBAT, WHICH HAS A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, IS NOW IN SERVICE IN POLAND AND THE GDR. THESE AIRCRAFT COMPARE IN SOME WAYS WITH THE MOST MODERN US AIRCRAFT.

SOPHISTICATED AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS OF MANY TYPES CONTINUE TO GO TO SYRIA, IRAQ, THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE YEMEN, AND, MORE RECENTLY, LIBYA, AND EGYPT IS STILL GETTING ARMS ALTHOUGH ON A REDUCED SCALE. CLEARLY THIS DELIBERATE POLICY OF HEATING UP THE MIDDLE EAST CAULDRON CAN'T BE RECONCILED IN MILITARY TERMS WITH AN ALLEGED DESIRE FOR TRANQUILLITY AND DETENTE.

TO SUM UP ON OUR CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, THE TREND OF EVENTS IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS HAS SHOWN THE SOVIETS TO BE KEEPING THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN FAIRLY LOW PROFILE, WHILE CONTINUING TO ADD GREATLY TO THEIR ARMOURY AND THEIR CAPABILITIES. SO I WOULD AGAIN SUGGEST TO MINISTERS, IF I MAY, THAT IT IS THEIR CAPACITY FOR AGGRESSION WHICH WE MUST GUARD AGAINST, RATHER THAN GIVING CREDENCE TO EXPRESSIONS OF GOOD INTENT WHICH HAVE SO OFTEN BEEN DISPROVED BY EVENTS.

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R 101655Z DEC 74

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9283

SECDEF WASHDC

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USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY MADRID

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

USLOSACLANT

CINCLANT

CINCUSAREUR
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FORCE PLANNING

MR. CHAIRMAN I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS MYSELF TO THE FORCE PLANNING FOR 1975-1979. I SAID IN JUNE THAT OUR FORCE GOALS THEN FELL FAR SHORT OF WHAT THE MAJOR NATO COMMANDERS HAD ASSESSED AS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE TASKS THAT YOU HAD LAID UPON THEM, AND THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE GAP BETWEEN OUR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES AND THOSE OF THE WARSAW PACT WAS WIDENING. THE DETAILS ARE, OF COURSE, IN THE VERY IMPORTANT NATO DOCUMENT - MC 161. I CAN ONLY ADD THAT SINCE THEN SEVERAL COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEWS HAVE TAKEN PLACE OR ARE IN PROGRESS. FROM THE INFORMATION THAT IS AVAILABLE TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE NOW, IT WOULD SEEM THAT LESS THAN HALF OF OUR FORCE GOALS ARE CONFIDENTIAL

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LIKELY TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED BY 1980.

THE GRAVITY OF THIS SITUATION NEEDS NO SPECIAL EMPHASIS FROM ME, AND YOU WILL KNOW FROM THE REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THAT THERE ARE SERIOUS DEFICIENCIES IN MANY AREAS OF OUR MILITARY CAPACITY. OF THESE I WOULD DRAW ATTENTION PARTICULARLY TO LOW MANNING LEVELS, RELIANCE ON RESERVISTS, SHORTAGES OF WAR RESERVE STOCKS, VERY LIMITED CAPABILITY FOR ELECTRONIC WARFARE, MOBILE AIR DEFENSE, A WIDENING GAP IN OUR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE ABILITY, AND DELAYED MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS.

I DO NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO OVER-STATE THESE PROBLEMS, NOR TO MINIMIZE THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE -- THE FACTS ARE ALL IN REPORTS YOU WILL BE CONSIDERING TODAY.

THE POINT OF DEPARTURE FOR OVERCOMING THESE DEFICIENCIES AND CONTINUING TO IMPROVE OUR CAPABILITY IS, OF COURSE, YOUR MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION YESTERDAY DEVOTED AN HOUR AND A HALF DISCUSSING THIS SUBJECT IN DEPTH, AND I HOPE, WHEN WE REACH THIS ITEM ON THE AGENDA, THAT I MAY CATCH YOUR EYE AGAIN, MR. CHAIRMAN. I MIGHT SAY HERE, STRAIGHTAWAY, THAT THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT GREATER COLLECTIVE CO-OPERATION IS CERTAINLY NEEDED, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ENHANCED IF LONGER RANGE AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE FORCE PLANNING, BOTH NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY, COULD BE MADE MORE OF A REALITY THAN IT IS TODAY. WE SEE WITHIN THE BROAD LINES OF THE PROPOSALS WHICH THE US HAS PUT FORWARD A MEANS OF MEETING THIS AIM, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WISH TO GIVE YOU OUR ADVICE ON THE DETAILS WHEN WE HAVE HAD TIME TO STUDY THEM MORE CAREFULLY.

SO FAR AS CONCRETE IMPROVEMENTS TODAY ARE CONCERNED, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT, CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT, IS THE CENTRALIZATION OF ALLIED AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH SECRETARY LAIRD PROPOSED FOUR YEARS AGO. THIS IMPROVE-

MENT IS BEING PROGRESSED AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, AND THE NEW
COMMANDER WAS ESTABLISHED AS A PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATE OF SACEUR
ON 28TH JUNE. MUCH DETAILED PLANNING WORK IS INVOLVED BEFORE
WE CAN SEEK YOUR APPROVAL FOR THE FOUR-PART PACKAGE, BUT THIS
SHOULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE THE END OF JANUARY. THE PLANS FOR
THE INITIAL PEACETIME HQ AT RAMSTEIN AND THE JOINT STATIC
WAR HQ AT BOERFINK ARE RECEIVING THE HIGHEST PRIORITY, BUT
PLANNING FOR THE CO-LOCATION OF 4 ATAF WITH CENTAG, AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT CO-LOCATED HQ FOR AAFCE AT BRUNSSUM
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ARE GOING FOWARD AT THE SAME TIME. THERE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY
BE A BILL FOR ADDITIONAL MANPOWER AND MONEY, BUT IT WOULD BE
PREMATURE TODAY FOR ME TO MENTION ANY OTHER ASPECTS OF THE
PLANS UNTIL THESE ARE REFERRED TO THE DPC IN PERMANENT SESSION.

MILITARY BUDGET

MR. CHAIRMAN I SAID JUST NOW THAT I WAS ACUTELY AWARE OF THE
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS THAT BEAR ON SO MANY NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE MILITARY ALLIANCE. THESE HAVE INEVITABLY BECOME A
MAJOR FACTOR IN MILITARY PLANNING AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR
THE FINANCING OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY BUDGET. I AM TOLD
THAT THE MBC REPORT TO THIS COMMITTEE STATES THAT IT IS THE
INTENTION TO FINANCE THE SAME LEVEL OF MILITARY ACTIVITY AS IN
1974. THIS WAS, AS YOU WILL RECALL, THE BASIC RECOMMENDATION
IN THE DOCUMENT MC 233, WHICH THE MILITARY COMMITTEE SENT
RECENTLY TO THIS COMMITTEE, BUT THERE IS STILL A DIFFERENCE OF
OPINION AS TO WHETHER THE MBC HAVE MADE SUFFICIENT PROVISION
TO ALLOW US TO ACHIEVE THE AIMS WE ALL AGREE ON. THE NUB OF
THE MATTER IS THAT IN REAL TERMS OUR BUDGET HAS BEEN STEADILY
DECREASING. IF WE CANNOT RECONCILE THIS ISSUE, AND I HOPE THAT
WE CAN, SOME MAJOR POLICY ISSUES, NOT JUST HAGGLING OVER DETAILS,
WILL BE INVOLVED, REQUIRING VERY EARLY DECISIONS AT THE
HIGHEST LEVEL. WE WOULD, IN FACT, BE DRAWN INTO A REVIEW OF
NATO DEFENSE POLICY, BUT WITHOUT THE TIME OR MACHINERY TO DO
IT PROPERLY.

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SAM-01 SAB-01 EB-07 OMB-01 MC-01 /104 W

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R 101655Z DEC 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9284
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4825
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
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CINCLANT
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 6888

STANDARDIZATION

MR. CHAIRMAN, APART FROM ONE OR TWO MATTERS ON WHICH I HOPE TO CATCH YOUR EYE WHEN THEY COME UP IN THE AGENDA, THERE IS ONLY ONE OTHER SUBJECT WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO MENTION NOW, AND THAT IS THE STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

NONE OF US CAN FAIL TO BE DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE GRAVITY OF THE ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS WHICH SO MANY NATIONS HAVE TO FACE AT THIS TIME, NOR AT THE CONSEQUENTIAL DIMINUTION OF OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY.

MAY I SUGGEST THAT AS WELL AS ADOPTING UNILATERAL MEASURES, IT IS TIME TO SEEK MULTI-NATIONAL REMEDIES. AS LONG AGO AS 1960, M. SPAAK COMMENTED THAT, "EACH ONE WANTS TO KEEP HIS RIFLE, CONFIDENTIAL

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HIS MACHINE GUN, HIS TANKS, HIS SHELLS. EACH ONE WANTS HIS AIR FORCE, HIS OWN NATIONAL AIRCRAFT, WHICH CAN ONLY BE USED UNDER RESTRICTED CONDITIONS." AND, SADLY, HIS STRICTURES ARE STILL TRUE TODAY, ALTHOUGH THE EXAMPLES MAY BE DIFFERENT.

I WILL, IF I MAY, CITE ONE OR TWO PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF THE WASTE OF MONEY, DUPLICATION OF SCIENTIFIC EFFORT, MISUSE OF TALENT, WASTE OF MANPOWER, AND, FINALLY, THE IMPACT ON MILITARY EFFICIENCY, THAT RESULTS FROM FAILURE TO TACKLE THIS PROBLEM COHESIVELY AND WITH DETERMINATION.

THE FIRST EXAMPLE IS IN THE FIELD OF NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS. VERY CONSIDERABLE SUMS HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO DATA LINK SYSTEMS BY BOTH THE U.S. AND THE U.K. SO WE NOW FIND IN THE ALLIANCE TWO DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, ONE FITTED BY FIVE NATIONS, AND THE OTHER BY THREE. THEY CANNOT SPEAK TO EACH OTHER NOR WITH SHORE STATIONS, AND EVEN A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM IS NOW GOING TO COST SOME 5 MILLION IAU.

THE NEXT CONCERNS OUR LAND FORCES, WHERE NATIONAL ELEMENTS IN ADJACENT SECTORS OF THE FORWARD DEFENSE AREAS CANNOT HELP EACH OTHER WITH SUPPLIES OF HARDWARE, BECAUSE THEY NEED DIFFERENT FUEL FOR TANKS, DIFFERENT CALIBRE AMMUNITION FOR THEIR GUNS,

AND A MASSIVE RANGE OF ENTIRELY DIFFERENT SPARES FOR VIRTUALLY ALL THEIR EQUIPMENT.

FINALLY, OUR AIR FORCES WHERE, FOR EXAMPLE, IN 2 ATAF THERE ARE FIVE DIFFERENT TYPES OF GUN AMMUNITION, FOUR DIFFERENT BOMBS, SIX DIFFERENT NAPALM CONTAINERS, AND SIXTEEN DIFFERENT DROP TANKS.

THE DUPLICATION IN SUPPORT COSTS BECAUSE OF THIS IS ONLY ONE FACTOR, BUT ALSO INDICATES WHY THE SOVIETS NEED ONLY ONE MAN IN SUPPORT TASKS WHERE WE NEED TWO.

IF I MAY ILLUSTRATE WHAT I MEAN BY THIS FAILURE TO STANDARDIZE OR, AT LEAST, ENSURE INTEROPERABILITY, I MUST TELL YOU THAT A RECENT NAVAL EXERCISE JUST ANALYZED SHOWED THAT DUE TO INCOMPATIBILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES OFTEN ENGAGED THE SAME TARGET SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND THE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT INVOLVED WERE SO OFTEN UNABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER THAT, AS A RESULT, OF THE 56 MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DESTROYED DURING THE EXERCISE, 30 WERE ASSESSED AS HAVING BEEN SHOT DOWN BY THEIR OWN SIDE.

I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE REAL ERRORS WERE MADE OVER THE YEARS BY US AND OUR PREDECESSORS IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE WISDOM OF M. SPAAK'S STRICTURES, AND IN THE FAILURE BY BOTH THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO APPRECIATE THAT NATIONAL CONFIDENTIAL

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INTERESTS ARE NOT ALWAYS BEST SERVED WHEN MEMBERS OF AN ALLIANCE INDULGE THEMSELVES IN UNCO-ORDINATED PRODUCTION AND UNNECESSARY COMPETITION.

FOR MY PART, I WARMLY ENDORSE THE CONCLUSIONS IN DPC/D(74)33, BEING CONSIDERED TODAY, AND I BELIEVE YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THE CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS HAVE DONE A GREAT DEAL TOWARDS IDENTIFYING THE AREAS WHERE ACTION NOW COULD BRING IMMEASURABLE ADVANTAGES IN THE FUTURE, BOTH TO NATIONS AND TO THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE. BUT ONLY MINISTERS CAN REPRESENT THE NATIONAL WILL AND SET IN MOTION THAT DRIVE NECESSARY TO OVERCOME OUR PROBLEMS.

THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN, FOR YOUR ATTENTION, AND THAT IS ALL THAT I WOULD WISH TO SAY AT THIS STAGE OF YOUR MEETING, MR. CHAIRMAN.

END QUOTE. BRUCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO06888
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741275/abbryzad.tel
Line Count: 367
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DPC MINISTERIAL MEETING DECEMBER 10, 1974: AGENDA ITEM II, STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
TAGS: MPOL NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
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CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSNAVEUR
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Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005